Abstract
This invention establishes means and protocols to secure data, using large undisclosed amounts of randomness, replacing the algorithmic complexity paradigm. Its security is credibly appraised through combinatorics calculus, and it transfers the security responsibility to the user who determines how much randomness to use. This TransVernam cryptography is designed to intercept the Internet of Things where the ‘things’ operate on limited computing capacity and are fueled by fast draining batteries. Randomness in large amounts may be quickly and conveniently stored in the most basic IOT devices, keeping the network safe.
Claims
 A symmetric cryptographic method called ‘Trans Vernam’ where secrecy is established by use of large as desired, quantities of randomness, where both the identity and the number of random bits constitute the cryptographic key, which is processed in conjunction with the plaintext, deploying only simple bitwise operations such that the effort of compromising the cryptogram, to the extent feasible, is credibly appraised in terms of required computational load.
 A method as in (1) where the user insures that a cryptanalyst in possession of only the cryptogram will not be able to determine with certainty the generating plaintext of that cryptogram, even if that cryptanalyst has unlimited computational capacity.
 A method as (1) where the user may use so much randomness that the cipher will be of Vernam grade, namely exhibit unconditional mathematical secrecy.
 A method as in (1) where the parties exchange a durable secret key in the form of a bit string of any desired size, and where each time the parties use the cipher for a communication session then the sender randomly selects adhoc session keys that are processed together with the durable secret to exercise a protocol that is immunized against a replay attack, that prevent replay fraud.
 A method as in (4) where one of the parties selects a sizeadjusting factor in the form of a binary string, and that is operated on in conjunction with the durable secret key to generate a session base key, K_{b }which is a bit string of a desired size (bit count).
 A method as in (5) where the parties agree on a method to parse the session base key to n unique substrings, and where the sender randomly selects a transposition key K_{t}(n) and applies it to transpose the n substrings identified on the session base key, to any of its nfactorial (n!) permutations, each permutation has a 1/n! chance to be selected, and where the transposed string is regarded as the transposed session base key, K*_{b}; and where furthermore the sender communicates the transposed session base key (K*_{b}) to the recipient, so that the recipient will verify that the transposed session base key is indeed a transposition of the session base key according to the recipient computation based on his or her knowledge of the session base key and the method of parsing it to n substrings; and where upon verification that K*_{b }is a transposed version of K_{b }the recipient (i) is assured that the sender shares the same durable secret key and then (2) finds out the value of the transposition key, K_{t }from comparing K_{b }and K*_{b}.
 A method as in (6) where the parties use the transposition key K_{t }to encrypt all the messages in that session, whether as a stand alone cipher, or as a cipher ingredient in a larger scheme.
 A method as in (6) where the transposition key K_{t }is determined from a physical noise, or other phenomena, and is not an algorithmic outcome.
Owners (US)
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Applicants

Samid Gideon
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Inventors

Samid Gideon
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CPC Classifications

H04L9/002
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H04L9/0656
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H04L9/0838
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H04L2209/08
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Document Preview
 Publication: Aug 31, 2017

Application:
Feb 18, 2017
US 201715436806 A

Priority:
Feb 18, 2017
US 201715436806 A

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