A METHOD AND APPARATUS FOR AUTHENTICATING A USER

VERFAHREN UND SYSTEM ZUR AUTHENTIFIZIERUNG EINES BENUTZERS

PROCÉDÉ ET DISPOSITIF POUR AUTHENTIFIER UN UTILISATEUR

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The present invention provides a method and apparatus for authenticating a user, in particular authenticating a user to a server across a network.

Referring to Figure 1, typically, when a user (Alice) authenticates through a web-application to a server, they are presented with a dialog box within their browser window into which they enter a username and password. The username and password are sent from the web client to the server where they are authenticated. In most cases the credentials are transferred from the client to the server using http. As such, they are prone to being intercepted by an attacker. If security is needed, an https protocol can be used. However, the credentials are still sent through the internet and servers are able to read them.

Asymmetric cryptography offers secure distributed authentication schemes over insecure communication channels. However, users are required to provide public and private key-pairs or digital certificates; and the certificate must be installed for a web browser. This is not an easy task for beginners nor might it be possible if the user is operating a browser from a restricted client such as an Internet café.

In US 4,926,479 as well as in Goldwasser, Micali, and Rackoff, “The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems”, STOC ’85: Proceedings of the seventeenth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 291-304, New York, NY, USA, 1985, ACM Press, discloses ZKP challenge-response authentication protocols, in which a prover proves his identity to a verifier, but the verifier is unable to compute the prover’s secret using any received data.

The prerequisite for the protocol is that a user, for instance Alice, has to register her name and a public key and only those credentials are accessible to the verifier. Alice somehow maintains a private key, and the public-private key-pair depends on an NP problem on which the protocol is based. Referring now to Figure 2, a typical ZKP authentication protocol operates as follows:

- Step 1 - Alice generates a random problem R and she computes f(R) using a one way hash function. The problem and the function are specific for the NP problem the protocol uses.
- Step 2 - She sends f(R) to the server where she wants to be authenticated. She keeps R secret.
- Step 3 - The server stores the received f(R) function and sends a request to Alice. The request contains a challenge. The challenge is a random decision that requires Alice to be capable of answering one of two questions: one of which demonstrates her knowledge of the private key (f(R, private key)); and the other, an easy question, to prevent her from cheating (R).
- Step 4 - Alice sends back the answer that depends on the challenge: f(R, private key) or R. She always reveals only one parameter.
- Step 5 - The server verifies her answer. If the answer is correct, the server can authenticate her or she can be queried for another challenge to decrease the probability of cheating; and thus, loop back to Step 1.

In the above protocol, Step 1 is also called witness, Steps 2 and 3 are challenge, whereas step 4 is response. If the protocol is repeated t times, all t rounds must be answered successfully to prove Alice’s identity. The server is always convinced with probability 1-2^{-t}. In zero-knowledge proof protocols, the verifier cannot learn anything from the authentication procedure. Moreover, the verifier is unable to cheat the prover because of having always only one value R or f(R, private key); this is not sufficient to calculate the prover’s secret. Furthermore, the verifier cannot cheat the prover because the protocol is repeated as long as the verifier is not convinced; due to random challenge selection, the verifier cannot pretend to be the prover to a third party.

Typically, ZKP challenge-response protocols are based on: the discrete logarithm problem, the square-root problem, or elliptical curve cryptography.

The discrete logarithm problem is defined as finding x such that

\[ g^x = b \mod n \]

where g, b, and n are known for both the prover and verifier and x must be coprime to n.

In the square-root problem, Alice wants to prove that she knows such an x that
x^2 = b \mod n

for known b, and n and where x must be co-prime to n.

In Elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) a public-private key-pair on an elliptic curve is defined as:

y^2 = x^3 + ax + b

where 4a^3 + 27b^2 \neq 0, and relies on a complexity of point multiplication over such a curve.

Nonetheless, in each of the above cases, the user’s private key must either be available on a local machine from which they are trying to authenticate themselves, or the user must allow their password to be transmitted across a network. The former makes a ZKP implementation based on the above problems infeasible within a browser, while the latter is undesirable.

It is an object of the present invention to provide a more secure form of authentication while preserving the ease of use of simplistic username/password systems within a web-browser application.

Disclosure of the Invention

The present invention provides a method according to claim 1.

The invention enables a zero-knowledge proof (ZKP) authentication protocol within a web-browser application.

In the preferred embodiment, the ZKP protocol is based on graph isomorphism which is simple to implement, fast, and provides significant benefits to developers who need to implement user authentication.

Graph isomorphism provides an NP (Non-deterministic Polynomial time) space wherein ZKP implementations can be produced without the computational overhead that has, until now, made ZKP inappropriate for casual user authentication.

The graph isomorphism does not require users’ browsers to find co-prime numbers nor multiplicative inverses. It is performed using natural numbers and therefore, its arithmetic is easier to implement than, for example elliptic curves.

Preferred embodiments of the invention are implemented with Ajax. JavaScript and Ajax are suitable for operations on natural numbers and matrices. They do not require plug-ins and they are supported by default by most web browsers. Hence, integration with existing applications is straightforward. Furthermore, their start-up time is negligible. Such embodiments may therefore be fully distributed, easy to install, and do not need to have any browser dependencies.

Brief Description of the Drawings

Embodiments of the invention will now be described by way of example, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

Figure 1 illustrates a typical web authentication scheme;

Figure 2 is a schematic diagram of a typical zero-knowledge proof challenge-response protocol;

Figure 3 illustrates a graph isomorphism;

Figure 4 illustrates the calculation of a permutation according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention; and

Figure 5 illustrates a ZKP protocol based on graph isomorphism according to a preferred embodiment of the present invention.

Description of the Preferred Embodiments

Referring now to Figure 3, another NP problem is graph isomorphism. Here, two graphs G_1 = (V_1,E_1) and G_2 = (V_2,E_2) that have the same sets of vertexes V_1=V_2={1,2,...,n} are isomorphic, if there exists a permutation \pi on vertexes {1, 2, ..., n} so that (u, v) \in E_1 \iff (\pi(u), \pi(v)) \in E_2.

With a protocol based on the graph isomorphism, a public key is composed of two isomorphic graphs G_1 and G_2, and a private key comprises a permutation \pi_p, such that G_2 = \pi_p(G_1). While the problem is not likely to be NP-complete, it is NP, as there is no known polynomial-time algorithm that solves the problem.

In a challenge-response protocol based on this public-private key pair, such as outlined in relation to Figure 2, a prover generates a random permutation \pi_R, and sends a graph G_R = \pi_R(G_1) to the verifier. Then, depending on the verifier’s challenge, the prover sends back \pi_R or \pi_R^2 such that \pi_R^2 = \pi_R \cdot \pi_p^{-1}, where G_1=\pi_p^{-1}(G_2) and \cdot is a composition operator on the two permutations.

Thus, the verifier is able to check one of the conditions:
Knowledge about only one parameter $\pi_R$ or $\pi_{R2}$ does not let the verifier compute the prover's private key. Nonetheless, when attempting to implement a ZKP protocol based on the graph isomorphism, there is still the problem of how to maintain, generate or provide access to the user's private key without transmitting their credentials across the network or requiring that they be stored locally on a user's machine.

In the preferred embodiment of the present invention, the browser calculates the private key required to implement the ZKP protocol from a user's password. The browser can then generate challenge graphs and challenge responses as described above or indeed for use in any private-public key authentication protocol.

Referring now to Figure 4, a user's private key $\pi$ is a permutation. In the preferred embodiment, a user's password is transformed to a corresponding permutation using a one-way function as well as taking other steps required to ensure the required size of permutation for use with graphs of a given size.

In the embodiment, Secure Hash Algorithm - Version 1.0 (SHA1) is used as this computes a 160-bits-long hash for any string that is no longer than $2^{64}$-bits. Such a hash is composed of numbers 0-9, a-f; and as such, the hash can be used at least as part of a hexadecimal index to a table of permutations.

All the generated hashes have the same size, i.e. 160 bits and so their corresponding index numbers when sorted in lexicographical order in a table are from $38!+1$ to $40!$. If the hash alone were used as an index into a table of permutations stored in lexicographical order, different hashes would be mapped to permutations of varying lengths. Thus, in the embodiment, all hashes are extended with a hexadecimal character "b" at the beginning of each obtained hash. This extension means that the extended hashes point to index positions $41!+1$ to $42!$; therefore, all the generated permutations have the same length.

The key size, of course, can be changed, if another hash generation algorithm is used.

In the preferred embodiment, the web-application calculates the permutation indicated by the extended hash in two steps, the first being based on the observation that all the natural numbers can be represented as:

$$a_{k-1}0! + a_{k-2}1! + a_{k-3}2! + \ldots + a_0k!$$

for any natural number $k$.

As such, we find the $a_{k-1}0! + a_{k-2}1! + a_{k-3}2! + \ldots + a_0k!$ representation of the extended hash.

This can be done using a function of the following form for converting "number", the extended hash in decimal format, to the vector $a[]$:

```cpp
Convert(number) {
    var int i:= 0;
    var int factor;
    var int a[]
    while(number > 0)
        {factor:= GreatestFactorial(number) 
        // returns the smallest factorial that is greater than the given number
        a[i]:= number/factor
        number:= number - a[i] * factor
        i=i+1
    return a
}
```

In the preferred embodiment GreatestFactorial() is implemented with a predefined table of factorials and a binary search algorithm.

A simple example of this first convert function follows:

562 = $4*5! + 3*4! + 1*3! + 2*2! + 0*1! + 0*0!$

We can easily calculate it dividing this number by highest possible factorials ($0! = 1$, $1! = 1$, $2! = 2$, $3! = 6$, $4! = 24$, $5! = 120$, $6! = 720$):

562/120=4 remainder 82
82/24=3 r 10
10/6=1 r 4
4/2=2 r 0
0/1=0 r 0
0/1=0 r 0
So, we create a table a[] and we fill the table with the calculated coefficients:


The second step of the conversion takes as input the table a[], and returns as output, a table permutation[] that contains the created permutation.

The convert function requires a temporary structure s, on which the following functions can be performed:

- `insert (x)` -> adds number x to the structure
- `remove (x)` -> removes number x from structure
- `elementAt (j)` -> returns a number i that satisfies the condition: there are exactly j-1 smaller numbers than i in the structure
- `full(n)` -> return a structure with integers 0,1,...,(n-1)

For example, with s=0,1,2,3 by removing an element at second position we get s=0,1,3, and if we repeat the operation we have s=0,1.

The structure s could comprise a simple table, however, the complexity of operating the table would be O(n).

In the preferred embodiment, a B-Tree, and in particular, an AVL tree which is a special case of a B-Tree is used for the structure s. In such structures, the computational complexity of removing elements is O(log n).

Convert (a)

```plaintext
{  
  var int n:= length a
  s:= full (n)
  for i=0 to (n-1)
  {  
      s.insert (i) //Initializing our temporary structure
  }
  for i=0 to (k-1)
  {  
      permutation[i]:=s.elementAt(a[i]) //getting an element at a certain position
      s.remove(a[i]) //removing the taken element
  }
  return permutation
}
```

Taking the previous example of an extended hash with a decimal value of 562, a temporary structure s[] of n=6 elements is first created, so:


Then, in the next loop we analyze the table a[] delivered by the first conversion:


Because a[0] = 4, so we take element s[4]=4 and add this to the permutation (p in the example below).

Therefore, p[0]=4, we remove this element from the structure s, so s has now 5 elements:

\[ s[0] = 0; s[1] = 1; s[2] = 2; s[3] = 3; s[4] = 5 \]

Then, a[1]=3, so:

\[ p[1] = 3 \]

and we remove this element from s:

\[ s[0]=0; s[1]=1; s[2]=2; s[3]=5 \]

Then, a[2]=1, so:

\[ p[2] = 1 \]

and s after removing this element:

\[ s[0] = 0; s[1] = 2; s[2] = 5 \]

Then, a[3]=2, so:

\[ p[3] = 5 \]

\[ s[0] = 0; s[1] = 2 \]

Then, a[4] = 0, so:

\[ p[4] = 0 \]

\[ s[0] = 2 \]

Then, a[5] = 0, so:
Therefore, we have generated the permutation:


It will therefore be seen from the examples above that from a variable length password, it is possible with code having a relatively small footprint capable of being downloaded and readily executed in a browser, to generate a permutation \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) which can in turn be used in a ZKP protocol to authenticate a user across a network without transmitting any private information across the network or requiring secure storage to be available locally.

For an example of such a protocol, let’s assume that Alice is the prover, whereas Bob is the verifier. She knows the permutation \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) between two graphs \( G_1 \) and \( G_2 \). Bob also knows the graphs. She wants to convince him that she knows the permutation, but she is going to keep it secret.

Registration:

1. Alice’s browser transforms her password to a permutation \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) that is her private key.
2. Alice’s browser generates a random graph \( G_1 \).
3. Alice’s browser computes graph \( G_2 = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1) \).
4. Alice’s browser publishes graphs \( G_1 \), \( G_2 \), and her username. She keeps \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) secret.

Alice is able to convince anybody that she is the publisher of such credentials, while she keeps the password secret.

Authentication, Figure 5:

1. Alice’s browser is acquiring the number of challenges \( t \) from Bob.
2. Alice’s browser generates \( t \) random permutations: \( \pi_{R1}, \pi_{R2}, \ldots, \pi_{Rt} \).
3. Alice’s browser calculates \( t \) graphs \( G_{R1}, G_{R2}, \ldots, G_{Rt} \) such that
   \[ G_{Rn} = \pi_{Rn}(G_1) \text{ where } n \in \{1, 2, \ldots, t\} \]
4. Alice’s browser sends the generated graphs to the Bob.
5. Bob stores the graphs and generates \( t \) random challenges \( v_1, v_2, \ldots, v_t \) such that for all \( i \in \{1, 2, \ldots, t\}, v_i \in \{0, 1\} \)
   (The number of challenges \( t \) is determined by the acceptable response time and is typically of the order of 30).
6. Bob sends the generated challenges to Alice.
7. Alice’s browser constructs a response vector \( R_1, R_2, \ldots, R_t \) such that

   \[
   \text{for } i = 1, 2, \ldots, t \text{ do}
   \]

   \[
   \text{if } v_i = 0 \text{ then}
   \]

   \[
   R_i = \pi_{Ri}
   \]

   \[
   \text{else}
   \]

   \[
   R_i = \pi_{Ri} \circ \pi_{\text{priv}}^{-1}
   \]

   \[
   \text{end if}
   \]

   \[
   \text{end for}
   \]

8. Alice’s browser sends the response vector to Bob.
Bob sends her a response. She is authenticated, only if all the challenges are answered correctly.

It will be seen from the outline of the protocol above that in order to authenticate a user, the protocol requires more than two steps: a user's request, a server's challenge, a user's response, and a server's response. Therefore, the protocol requires flexible communication. Thus, to make the zero-knowledge authentication feasible for a web application, preferred implementations of the invention are based on asynchronous technologies such as Ajax.

The term Ajax (Asynchronous JavaScript and XML) was introduced in 2005 and it enables communication between a user's browser and a server from which the user downloads a page. The communication is done by means of JavaScript and XML messages. Since the technology uses a scripting language, it is relatively slow. However, it is supported by most browsers, including Internet Explorer 5.0+, Firefox 1.0+, Safari 1.2, Opera 7.6+, Gecko browsers (Netscape, Camino, K-Meleon, Galeon), Konqueror 3.3 with a patch, and several others. There is no need for an additional plug-in, hence a code is always executed right after a page is loaded.

In the above described embodiments, the hash is created from a user's password. However, the invention can equally be implemented with alternative user specific identifiers.

Some such identifiers can be generated from a user's biometric characteristics, as long as the client device has access to this information. For example, the client device might include a fingerprint reader, a retinal reader, a smart card reader for reading user specific information from a user's smart card, or a wireless adapter capable or pairing the client device with another device which stores the user specific identifier, for example, a user's mobile phone.

For biometric information, it is important that the user is scanned such that the same identifier is produced each time, so that a consistent hash can be generated from this identifier.

The present invention can also be applied to other ZKP techniques that involve deriving a permutation from a password. For example, the sub-graph isomorphism, is a very similar problem to the graph isomorphism and is also known to be NP-hard. Hence, it is potentially more difficult to solve. This problem is a common generalization of many important graph problems (Clique, Independent Set, Hamiltonian Cycle, Matching, Girth, Shortest Path). With a protocol based on the sub-graph isomorphism, a public key is composed of two graphs $G_2$ and $A_1$, and a private key comprises a graph $G_1$ that is a sub-graph of $A_1$ and a permutation $\pi_{priv}$ such that $G_2 = \pi_{priv}(G_1)$.

In one particular challenge-response protocol based on this public-private key pair, a prover generates a random permutation $\pi_R$ such that $G_R = \pi_R(A_1)$, then the prover embeds graph $G_R$ into a bigger graph $A_2$ and sends a graph $A_2$ to the verifier. Then, depending on the verifier's challenge, the prover sends back $\pi_R$ and $G_R$, or a composition $\pi_R \circ \pi_{priv}^{-1}$ and the graph $G_R$.

Thus, the verifier is able to check one of the conditions:

$$\pi_R(A_1) = G_R \text{ or } \pi_R \circ \pi_{priv}^{-1}(G_2) = G_R;$$
EP 2 229 750 B1

[0066] Using this protocol changes some of the properties that are achieved using graph isomorphism: the public keys are bigger; more memory and bandwidth are required to perform communication and computation; and the problem is known to be more difficult to break.

[0067] By comparison with the first embodiment, the second embodiment is implemented generally as follows:

Since the private key comprises of two elements: a permutation $\pi_{\text{priv}}$ and the sub-graph $G_1$, there is a need to calculate two elements from the given user’s password.

[0068] $A_1$ is first chosen as a random graph of size 41.

[0069] As before, the user’s password is transformed with SHA1 to provide an extended hash comprising 20 hexa-decimal characters, each character being represented by 4 bits. Hence there are 80 significant bits and these 80 bits are used to select a sub-graph $G_1$ of $A_1$.

[0070] For example:

- If the hash bits are 00 or 01, we skip the vertex of $A_1$.
- If the hash bits are 10 or 11, we take the vertex of $A_1$ to the sub-graph $G_1$.
- Vertex number 41 of $A_1$ is taken to the sub-graph $G_1$, if the amount of bits in the extended hash was even.

[0071] This method generates a sub-graph $G_1$ that can be of a size up to 41. It implies that the size of the permutation $\pi_{\text{priv}}$ also has to vary in the given range (0-41). Therefore, there is also a need to normalize the extended hash to generate correct permutation size.

[0072] Thus, the normalized value $x$ is calculated from the extended hash (in decimal format) as:

$$x := \text{(number of vertices of } G_1)! / 41! \times \text{(extended hash)}$$

[0073] The normalized hash value $x$ is then passed to the Convert(number) function described above to return the permutation $\pi_{\text{priv}}$.

[0074] Other means can be employed to store the user’s identifier including portable storage devices, connecting to the client device through a USB port; or RFID devices carried by a user.

[0075] The invention is not limited to the embodiment(s) described herein but can be amended or modified without departing from the scope of the present invention.

Claims

1. A method of generating a user’s private key for use in a ZKP authentication protocol comprising, at a client:
   
   - receiving a user specific identifier provided by the user;
   - converting the identifier through a one-way function to a string of a pre-determined length; and
   - mapping said string to a permutation $\pi_{\text{priv}}$ of a pre-determined order, said permutation being operable with a first graph $G_1$ to generate a second public graph $G_2 = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1)$ wherein said permutation is the user’s private key.

2. A method according to claim 1 wherein the user specific identifier comprises one of: a password entered by the user; or biometric data read from the user at said client.

3. A method of registering a user of a client device to a server computer across a network, comprising:
   
   - receiving a username for said user;
   - generating a private key according to the method of claim 1;
   - generating said first graph $G_1$ of an order corresponding with said private key;
   - generating said second public graph $G_2 = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1)$; and
   - providing said username for said user and said first and second graphs to said server.

4. A method of authenticating a user of a client device to a server across a network comprising:
   
   - generating a private key according to the method of claim 1;
   - at said client:
     
     a) transmitting a username for said user to said server;
b) receiving one or more challenges from said server;
c) for each challenge n, generating an associated random private key \( \pi_{Rn} \);
d) responsive to the value of the associated challenge, combining the random private key with a version of said private key \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) to provide a response \( R_n \) comprising one of said combination or said random private key;
e) for each challenge generating a graph \( G_{Rn} = R_n(G_1) \); and  
f) for each challenge, transmitting said response \( R_n \) and said graph \( G_{Rn} \) to said server.

5. A method according to claim 4 further comprising:

at said server:

g) for each challenge, receiving said associated response \( R_n \) and said graph \( G_{Rn} \);
h) responsive to the value of the associated challenge, generating a graph \( G_{\text{temp}} = \pi_{Rn}(G_1) \) or \( G_{\text{temp}} = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1) \); and  
i) comparing \( G_{\text{temp}} \) with \( G_{Rn} \) to authenticate said user.

6. A method according to claim 4 wherein said version of said private key \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \) comprises \( \pi_{\text{priv}}^{-1} \) where \( G_1 = \pi_{\text{priv}}^{-1}(G_2) \).

7. A method according to claim 1 wherein said one-way function comprises a secure hash function and said string comprises a hash provided by said hash function.

8. A method according to claim 7 wherein said mapping comprises:

converting a number \( \text{num} \) corresponding to said hash to a vector \( \text{a[]} \) of length \( k \) wherein: \( \text{num} = a_{k-1} \cdot 10! + a_{k-2} \cdot 1! + \ldots + a_0 \cdot 1! \); and  
converting said vector \( \text{a[]} \) to said private key \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \).

9. A method according to claim 8 wherein said converting said vector \( \text{a[]} \) comprises:

creating a structure \( s[] \) of length \( k \), each element of said structure comprising an element of said private key \( \pi_{\text{priv}} \); and  
iteratively choosing a value for each position of the private key as a function of the value of the corresponding element of the vector \( \text{a[]} \).

10. A method according to claim 9 wherein said function of the element of the vector \( \text{a[]} \) returns a number \( i \) that satisfies the condition: there are exactly \( j-1 \) smaller numbers than \( i \) in the structure, \( j \) being the value of the element of the vector \( \text{a[]} \); and wherein said method further comprises:

removing said element \( i \) from the structure \( s[] \).

11. A method as claimed in claim 1 comprising:

randomly generating a public graph \( A_1 \); and  
generating the first graph \( G_1 \) as a sub-graph of the graph \( A_1 \) as a function of said user specific identifier.

12. A method as claimed in claim 11 wherein the step of generating the sub-graph \( G_1 \) comprises:

sequentially selecting vertices for the sub-graph \( G_1 \) from the graph \( A_1 \) in accordance with the value of successive bits of said string.

13. A method as claimed in claim 12 further comprising:

prior to mapping said string to said private key, normalizing said string in accordance with the size of said sub-graph \( G_1 \) so that the size of said private key corresponds with the size of said sub-graph \( G_1 \).

14. A computer program product comprising computer readable code which when executed on a computing device is arranged to perform the steps of claim 1.

15. A computer program product according to claim 14 implemented in Javascript and executable with a web browser running on said computing device.
Patentansprüche

1. Verfahren zum Generieren eines privaten Schlüssels eines Benutzers zur Verwendung in einem ZKP-Authentifizierungsprotokoll, das bei einem Client Folgendes umfasst:

   - Empfangen einer von dem Benutzer bereitgestellten benutzerspezifischen Kennung;
   - Umwandeln der Kennung durch eine Einwegfunktion in eine Zeichenkette von vorbestimmter Länge; und
   - Zuordnen der Zeichenkette zu einer Permutation $\pi_{\text{priv}}$ einer vorbestimmten Ordnung, wobei die Permutation mit einem ersten Graphen $G_1$ zum Generieren eines zweiten öffentlichen Graphen $G_2 = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1)$ operierbar ist, wobei die Permutation der private Schlüssel des Benutzers ist.

2. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei die benutzerspezifische Kennung eines von Folgenden umfasst: ein Passwort, das von einem Benutzer eingegeben wird; oder biometrische Daten, die an dem Client vom Benutzer abgelesen werden.

3. Verfahren zum Registrieren eines Benutzers eines Client-Geräts bei einem Server-Computer über ein Netzwerk, umfassend:

   - Empfangen eines Benutzernamens für den Benutzer;
   - Generieren eines privaten Schlüssels nach dem Verfahren von Anspruch 1;
   - Generieren des ersten Graphen $G_1$ von einer Ordnung, die mit dem privaten Schlüssel übereinstimmt;
   - Generieren des zweiten öffentlichen Schlüssels $G_2 = \pi_{\text{priv}}(G_1)$; und Bereitstellen des Benutzernamens für den Benutzer und des ersten und zweiten Graphen für den Server.

4. Verfahren zum Authentifizieren eines Benutzers eines Client-Geräts bei einem Server-Computer über ein Netzwerk, umfassend:

   - Generieren eines privaten Schlüssels nach dem Verfahren von Anspruch 1; bei dem Client:
     a) Senden eines Benutzernamens für den Benutzer an den Server;
     b) Empfangen einer oder mehrerer Aufforderungen von dem Server;
     c) Generieren eines zugehörigen zufälligen privaten Schlüssels $\pi_{\text{R}}$ für jede Aufforderung $n$;
     d) Kombinieren des zufälligen privaten Schlüssels mit einer Version des privaten Schlüssels $\pi_{\text{priv}}$, um in Reaktion auf den Wert der zugehörigen Aufforderung eine Antwort $R_n$ bereitzustellen, die eine der Kombinationen oder den zufälligen privaten Schlüssel umfasst;
     e) Generieren eines Graphen $G_{\text{R}} = R_n(G_1)$ für jede Aufforderung; und
     f) Senden der Antwort $R_n$ und des Graphen $G_{\text{R}}$ für jede Aufforderung an den Server.

5. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, ferner umfassend:

   - bei dem Server:
     g) Empfangen der zugehörigen Antwort $R_n$ und des Graphen $G_{\text{R}}$, für jede Aufforderung;
     h) Generieren eines Graphen $G_{\text{temp}} = \pi_{\text{R}}(G_1)$ oder $G_{\text{temp}} = \pi_{\text{R}}(G_1)$ in Reaktion auf den Wert der zugehörigen Aufforderung; und
     i) Vergleichen von $G_{\text{temp}}$ mit $G_{\text{R}}$, um den Benutzer zu authentifizieren.

6. Verfahren nach Anspruch 4, wobei die Version des privaten Schlüssels $\pi_{\text{priv}} \pi_{\text{priv}}^{-1}$ umfasst, wobei $G_1 = \pi_{\text{priv}}^{-1}(G_2)$.

7. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, wobei die Einwegfunktion eine sichere Hash-Funktion umfasst und die Zeichenkette einen von der Hash-Funktion bereitgestellten Hash-Wert umfasst.

8. Verfahren nach Anspruch 7, wobei das Zuordnen Folgendes umfasst:

   Umwandeln einer Zahl $\text{num}$, die dem Hash-Wert entspricht, in einen Vektor $a[]$ mit der Länge $k$, wobei: $\text{num} = a_{k-1}0! + a_{k-2}1! + a_{k-3}2! + ... + a_0k!$; und
Umwandeln des Vektors $a$ in den privaten Schlüssel $\pi_{priv}$.  

9. Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, wobei das Umwandeln des Vektors $a$ Folgendes umfasst:

Erstellen einer Struktur $s$ mit der Länge $k$, wobei jedes Element der Struktur ein Element des privaten Schlüssels $\pi_{priv}$ umfasst; und

Iteratives Wählen eines Werts für jede Position des privaten Schlüssels als Funktion des Werts des entsprechenden Elements des Vektors $a$. 

10. Verfahren nach Anspruch 9, wobei die Funktion des Elements des Vektors $a$ eine Zahl $i$ zurückgibt, die folgende Bedingung erfüllt: es gibt genau $j-1$ kleinere Zahlen als $i$ in der Struktur, wobei $j$ der Wert des Elements des Vektors $a$ ist; und wobei das Verfahren ferner Folgendes umfasst:

Entfernen des Elements $i$ aus der Struktur $s$. 

11. Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, umfassend:

Zufälliges Generieren eines öffentlichen Graphen $A_1$; und

Generieren des ersten Graphen $G_1$ als Untergraphen des Graphen $A_1$ als Funktion der benutzerspezifischen Kennung. 

12. Verfahren nach Anspruch 11, wobei der Schritt des Generierens des Untergraphen $G_1$ Folgendes umfasst:

Sequentielles Auswählen von Scheitelpunkten für den Untergraphen $G_1$ aus dem Graphen $A_1$ in Übereinstimmung mit dem Wert von aufeinander folgenden Bits der Zeichenkette. 

13. Verfahren nach Anspruch 12, ferner umfassend:

Vor dem Zuordnen der Zeichenkette zu dem privaten Schlüssel Normalisieren der Zeichenkette in Übereinstimmung mit der Größe des Untergraphen $G_1$, so dass die Größe des privaten Schlüssels mit der Größe des Untergraphen $G_1$ übereinstimmt. 


15. Computerprogrammprodukt nach Anspruch 14, das in Javascript implementiert und mit einem Web-Browser, der auf dem Computergerät läuft, ausführbar ist. 

Revendications 

1. Procédé de génération d’une clé privée d’utilisateur à utiliser dans un protocole d’authentification ZKP, comprenant, au niveau d’un client :

la réception d’un identifiant spécifique à l’utilisateur fourni par l’utilisateur ;

la conversion de l’identifiant par le biais d’une fonction unidirectionnelle en une chaîne de caractères d’une longueur prédéterminée ; et

le mappage de ladite chaîne de caractères sur une permutation $\pi_{priv}$ d’un ordre prédéterminé, ladite permutation pouvant fonctionner avec un premier graphique $G_1$ pour générer un second graphique public $G_2=\pi_{priv}(G_1)$, ladite permutation étant la clé privée de l’utilisateur. 

2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel l’identificateur spécifique à l’utilisateur comprend l’un des éléments suivants : un mot de passe saisi par l’utilisateur ; ou des données biométriques lues de l’utilisateur au niveau dudit client. 

3. Procédé d’enregistrement d’un utilisateur d’un dispositif client sur un serveur informatique à travers un réseau, comprenant :

la réception d’un nom d’utilisateur pour ledit utilisateur ;

la génération d’une clé privée selon le procédé de la revendication 1 ;

la génération dudit premier graphique $G_1$ d’un ordre correspondant à ladite clé privée ;
la génération dudit second graphique public $G_2 = \pi_{piv}(G_1)$ ; et
la fourniture dudit nom d’utilisateur pour ledit utilisateur et lesdits premier et second graphiques audit serveur.

4. Procédé d’authentification d’un utilisateur d’un dispositif client sur un serveur à travers un réseau, comprenant :
   la génération d’une clé privée selon le procédé de la revendication 1 ;
   au niveau dudit client :
   a) la transmission d’un nom d’utilisateur pour ledit utilisateur audit serveur ;
   b) la réception d’un ou de plusieurs défis provenant dudit serveur ;
   c) pour chaque défi $n$, la génération d’une clé privée aléatoire associée $\pi_{R_n}$ ;
   d) en réponse à la valeur du défi associé, l’association de la clé privée aléatoire avec une version de ladite clé privée $\pi_{piv}$ pour fournir une réponse $R_n$ comprenant l’une de ladite combinaison ou de ladite clé privée aléatoire ;
   e) pour chaque défi, la génération d’un graphique $G_{R_n} = R_n(G_1)$ ; et
   f) pour chaque défi, la transmission de ladite réponse $R_n$ et dudit graphique $G_{R_n}$, audit serveur.

5. Procédé selon la revendication 4, comprenant en outre :
   au niveau dudit serveur :
   g) pour chaque défi, la réception de ladite réponse associée $R_n$ et dudit graphique $G_{R_n}$ ;
   h) en réponse à la valeur du défi associé, la génération d’un graphique $G_{temp} = \pi_{R_n}(G_1)$ ou $G_{temp} = \pi_{R_n}(G_2)$ ; et
   i) la comparaison de $G_{temp}$ avec $G_{R_n}$ pour authentifier ledit utilisateur.

6. Procédé selon la revendication 4, dans lequel ladite version de ladite clé privée $\pi_{piv}$ comprend $\pi_{piv}^{-1}$ où $G_1 = \pi_{piv}^{-1}(G_2)$.

7. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel ladite fonction unidirectionnelle comprend une fonction de hachage sécurisée et ladite chaîne de caractères comprend un hachage fourni par ladite fonction de hachage.

8. Procédé selon la revendication 7, dans lequel ledit mappage comprend :
   la conversion d’un nombre $num$ correspondant audit hachage en un vecteur $a[]$ de longueur $k$ dans lequel :
   $num = a_{k-1}1! + a_{k-2}2! + a_{k-3}2! + ... + a_0k!$ ; et
   la conversion dudit vecteur $a[]$ en ladite clé privée $\pi_{piv}$.

9. Procédé selon la revendication 8, dans lequel ladite conversion dudit vecteur $a[]$ comprend :
   la création d’une structure $s[]$ de longueur $k$, chaque élément de ladite structure comprenant un élément de ladite clé privée $\pi_{piv}$ ; et
   le fait de choisir par itération une valeur pour chaque position de la clé privée comme une fonction de la valeur de l’élément correspondant du vecteur $a[]$.

10. Procédé selon la revendication 9, dans lequel ladite fonction de l’élément du vecteur $a[]$ renvoie un nombre $i$ qui satisfait à la condition : il y a exactement $j-1$ nombres plus petits que $i$ dans la structure, $j$ étant la valeur de l’élément du vecteur $a[]$ ; et dans lequel ledit procédé comprend en outre :
    l’enlèvement dudit élément $i$ de la structure $s[]$.

11. Procédé selon la revendication 1, comprenant :
    la génération de manière aléatoire d’un graphique public $A_1$ ; et
    la génération du premier graphique $G_1$ en tant que sous-graphique du graphique comme une fonction dudit identifiant spécifique à l’utilisateur.

12. Procédé selon la revendication 11, dans lequel l’étape de génération du sous-graphique $G_1$ comprend :
    la sélection séquentielle des sommets pour le sous-graphique $G_1$ à partir du graphique conformément à la valeur des bits successifs de ladite chaîne de caractères.
13. Procédé selon la revendication 12, comprenant en outre :
avant le mappage de ladite chaîne de caractères sur ladite clé privée, la normalisation de ladite chaîne de caractères
en fonction de la taille dudit sous-graphique G₁ de sorte que la taille de ladite clé privée corresponde à la taille dudit
sous-graphique G₁.

14. Produit de programme informatique comprenant un code lisible par ordinateur qui, lorsqu’il est exécuté sur un
dispositif informatique, est conçu pour exécuter les étapes de la revendication 1.

15. Produit de programme informatique selon la revendication 14, mis en œuvre en Javascript et exécutable avec un
navigateur Web fonctionnant sur ledit dispositif informatique.
Figure 1 (Prior art)
\[ \pi = f(1) = c \quad f(2) = a \quad f(3) = b \quad f(4) = e \quad f(5) = d \]

**Figure 3**

- \( G_2 \)
- \( G_1 \)

Networks with labeled nodes.
Variable length password → SHA1 → Hash → Decimal extended hash

1st Convert → 2nd Convert → Permutation

Figure 4
REFERENCES CITED IN THE DESCRIPTION

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